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"I'óiti papcr analy2cr Lhc spalial cornpcLiLion in conimission fix~ bclwcx~n Lwo
maóeh inakcrs. 'I'hc:~c mal.ch makcrw ~crvc a,v middlcinen bctwaen I~uycrti and
sellerw who are localed unifonnly on a circle. 'L'hc~ proliLs of óhe rnalch makers
arc delcnnincd by thcir re~pccLivc markcó sizes. A IimileKl willingnc~~ti Lcr pay
is incorporaLed by mcana of ri~scrvaóicm priccw. If 6hc fracaiou of buycrs and
scllers is uncyual, ~hc match makers arc willing lo subsidizc t,hc shorl, nidc of
Lhe markcL, while Lhc long sidc is exploiLcd cornpleLely, providcd rexcrvaóion
prices are ~uHiciently high. CompeLition is Lóeu concenórated entirely on
Lhe ahorL sidc. When reservation prices are low, lwo bcal monoperlie4 will
emcrgc.
Kcywords: Matching, rniddlcrnen, spaLial pricc cornpc~ition.i
1 Introduction
lu rnany rnarkcts, interrnccliation plays an important. rolc. In Lhis papcr,
intermaliation in bilatcral matching markets is studiccl. In thesc I,ypes of
rnarkctti, thcrc arc t.wo typ(w of agcnts, ca.c:h of whic:h ti(Y;kY to trad(~ with
an agenL of the other I,ype. In this paper we focus on interrncYliation by
rniddlcrncn, in linc with, for cxamplc, RuhinKLcin and Wolinsky (I!)87), and
13hattacharya and Yava.4 (1993).
Gssentially, we can diatinguish two cliKerent typcs of rnidcllenren, narnely
markct rnakers ancl malch mnkcrs (scx Yavag (199'l) for a c:ompariaun). Mar-
keL rnakers are actually involved in the Lrade proce~e5, in the sentie t.hat, thcy
buy cornrnuclitics from scllcra, ancl rescll Lhcrn Lo buycrY. 'fhc rolc uf markct
makars is sl,udicd by, c.g., liubsintitein and WolinKky (I!)R7). Match makcra
arc not. involvccl in thc tracling proc:osa; thcy just n)akc I,radc putisiblc by
bringing buycrs ancl sellera Logcther. '1'his papcr atudicti a rnarket urganizecl
by rr)'At.CI) makers.
Wc analyiA, a rnodcl of spatial compctition in annmisaion G~c~ bcl,wcx,n two
rnatch tnakcrs. Wc devclop a Salop (1979) typc moclcl of compc6ition on a
markeL for one commodity. In our rnoclcl, therc arc conl.inuum populal.ions of
buyers and sellers, uni(orrnly diytributed over a circular city (acx, also Weben
(199~)). I;ach SCIICC owrlR onc unit of an incliviaiblc commodil.y, which hc
desinw to acll to one of thc buycrs and, morcover, cach buyer cl(wires 6o buy
onc unit. We make thc trivial assumption thal. thcrc arc gainti frorn Lradc.
13uycrti and scllcrs havc tu makc usc o[ Lhc scrvic;eti of onc of Lhc two match
rnakcrti in or(Icr Lo traclc. If a buycr or sellcr go(~ to a rnat( h rnakcr, hc
pays a(:onunitision foc Lo thc nratch n)akcr, pruviclcd hc iy nralchcd. 13cnides
a connnitisiou fcx~, buyen and scllcrv incur a rclal.ionxl cost hy ~oing Lo a
mat.ch rnakcr. 'l'hi9 includcs a)sts of cffort., scarch, Lranyport.al,ion, ctc.
'1'hc focus of our modcl is on thc compctition in cornrnission fc~c~a bcl,wccn
Lhc rnatch nrakcrs. 'I'herc(orc, thc nrcchanisrn by whic:h I,radc is pcrforrncYl,
is not rnoclclccl cxplicitly. Such a mcchanisrn could bc a r.ompcl,it.ivc rnar-
ket (Shaplcy ancl Shubik (1972)), or bargaining (1{.ubinxtcin arl(1 WOIIf19ky
(198Fi)).a
We incorporate a limited willingness to pay into the model, in the form of
reservation prices. 'I'he reservation price indicates how much a buyer or seller
ie willing to apend, in terms of the fee and the relational cost, in order to
be matched by a match maker. Reservation prices influence the 'potential
market areas' oí the match makers, being the fraction of buyers or sellers at
a match maker whose fee and relational cost are covered fully by the reser-
vation price. Following Webers (1995), we can distinguish three different
regimes of potential market areas at given prices: Strong competition, which
is the case if the potential market areas of the two match makers at these
prices have a nonempty intersection for both types of agents, weak competi-
tion, in case the potential market areas of the match makers at these prices
have a nonempty intersection for one of the two types of agents and for the
other type the íntersection is either a point or empty, and no competition, in
case the potential market areas of the match makers at these prices have an
intersection which is either a point or empty for both types of agents. The
notion of potential market areas is a generalization of the one formulated by
Gabszewicz and Thisse ( 1986), which holds for prices equal to zero.
The profits of the match makers are determined by their respective market
sizes. The match makers first serve the closest agents, which can be inter-
preted as agents located further being served later. Furthermore firms expect
buyers and sellers to be naive, in the sense that every buyer and seller is ex-
pected to go to the rnatch maker whose surn of fee and relational cost is the
lowest. We do not try to include more sophisticated expcxtations oí the firms
with respect to agents' behavior, because the firms have no a priori infor-
mation about the distribution of buyers and sellers over the match makers.
As one may argue however buyers' and sellers' belieís about being matched
might influence their behavior. We do not consider this, because we want
to focus on the competition in commission fees. In other words the firms do
not take into account the risk for buyers and sellers of not being matchedl.
Equilibrium fees are suclr that agents indeed cannot do better than acting
naive, which yields a consistent equilibrium path.
r In some aense, this riak could be related to the riek asaociated with the timely delivery
of producta ( Eepinosa (1992)).'I'hc profit of a match makcr is dctcrrninccl by thc minimum of t,hc sizcs
of his potential markcL arcas of buycrs and scllcrs, by óhc assfnnption Lhat
only tnatchcd agents pay Lhc cornrnission fcc~. 'I'hcrcforc, whcn maxirnizing
profits, a rnatch makcr cyuals I,hc buycr and acllcr fractiuns hc scrvcw. Ry
óhis prupcrty, t,hc casc of uncyual densitics of scllcrs and buycrs along thc
circlc~, has to bc distinguishcd Gom thc cyual dcnsity ca.w,. If clcnsitics arr
uncyual, nu cornpctif.ion and wcak compctition cau only occur in cquilihriurn.
If dcnsitics arc cyual, strong compctition uray also occur.
'I'wo interesting resulLs follow Gorn the model. I'irst, Lhc re~striction on one
sidc of thc markct implics thaL for su(ficicn6ly high rescrvat.ion pricxs, t.hc long
side of Lhc markct can bc'cxploited' completc:ly by the middlcnrcn. Since Lhe
short sidc clctcnniucw Lhc fnidcilcrncns' pro(its cntircly, it is noL upl.irnal for
thc firnrs Lo competc for thc agcnts on thc long siclc. Ilcncc, Lhc firms' profits
tend to infinity if n~ervat.iou prices become larger aud larger. Second, LLe
agents on the short side of the market may entircJy 'frce ricle', in Lhe sensc
Lhat Lhey pay a zero cornmission fec. In ec{uilibrium, Lhc rniddlcrnen evcn
clesire to subsiclizc these agents. 'f6c positive effcct of Lhe fcx~s on potential
markeL arcas is Lhcn dotninating Lhe uegative e(fect. on profits. hur cxse of
exposition, we restrict ounelves to non-net;ative fec~s in Lhe firsL secl.ions of Lhe
paper. lu Lhe final section we discuss whaL happens if we allow (or negative
fc.~c~s. 'I'hcrc firms rnay givc subsidics. A rcal-lifc examplc of such a situation
are clat.ing agcncicw, whcrc óhc shorL sidc of thc rnarkcl, is subsidizcxl.
In thc casc of cqual dcnsitic~s, thc asymmctry bcl.wccn thc long and shorl, sidc
of Lhe market disappears complete.ly. A largc arnomft of cxtuilibrium inde-
terminacy is created for eyual densitics. hor unequal clensit,ics, this problern
docs not occur, cxccpt for a nou-gcncric scL of pararnctcrs. 'l'hc ca.tic of cqual
densitics itsclf is nou-geueric, óowever, so LhaL the indet,cnninacy cloes uol,
cause Loo serious problems. '1'he case of eyual densities is aualyzcd in orcler
Lo providc a bcnchmark.
!16 isi ofLen xvsumecl in the literature, Lhaó eilher Lhe supply is noL bincling or Lhe
clernand funcf,iona of Lho firms are exogenons. In our moclel, lhn 'daruand funcLionx', is.,
lhe puf.ouóial m:crkcls, arc endog~aroue. 'I'hc modcl ~~an bo w~en .w a'ntra6egic mxrkeL
covcragd typc. SLraLcgic markeL covcragc Lhrough xdvcrliaing w;w coneidcrod by Boycr
and Morenux (199'l).4
The remainder of this paper is organized as followa. In Section 2, the model is
formulated. In Section 3, the equilibria of the price-setting game are derived,
for the cases of equal densities and unequal densities. Section A provides a
characterization of the equilibria. In Section 5, comparative statics is per-
formed between the cases of equal densities and unequal densities. Finally,
in Section 6, we discuss the situation in which there are explicit subsidies.
2 The Model
In the model there are three different parties. First, there are two different
types of agents. Agents of type 1 ate willing to sell a unit of a homogeneous
indivisible good and agents of type 2 are willing to buy a unit of this good.
In order to trade thcy nced a third party, say intermediaries, whose service
it is to match the acllers and the bttyers. '1'hese irttermediaries arc referred
to as firms. The number of firms is equal to two. Firm j, j E{ I,`l}, clrarges
price or fee rb~ to agents of type i, i E{1,2}, for providing this service. Let
~~ denote the tuple of prices G~~,~~ 1 for j E{1,2}.
Agents of type i, i E{ 1, 2}, are located uniformly along a circle with perime-
ter 1. The density equals rr for type 1 agents and Q for type 2 agents, where
a, ~ 1 0. For ease oF exposition we let a G Q, so potential demand is at
least as large as potcntial supply, although all results will hold as well in case
o~ Q. Firms are located symmetrically along the circle, so they are located
at maximum distance from each other. Firm 1's location will be fixed at 0,
so firm 2's loca,tion is z.
Both types of agents face identical linear relational costs with unit cost t, 0.
Furthermote agents of type i, i E{1,2}, have reservation price p; for the
relational costs and fees charged by any of the two firms, i.e., they want to
pay up to an amount p; for the firms' services. The reservation prices are
assumed to be given exogenously. It may happen well that the fees or the
relational costs are so high that the reservation price cannot cover these.Definition 2.1 'I'hc polenlial markcl arca of finn j, j E{ l,'l}, for aycnls
nf lypc i, i E { I,'l}, at pricc ~i~, (lr,nolr.d 6y ~1~1;~(~~}, is lhc sr.l of ag(.nts of
l~pe i, for tnhich lhr. sum nf lhc rr-lalional coal and lltr pricr. (a~ rhruY~crl b,y
fir-m j(lors nnt excced lhr, rr-scnmlion prir:r..
Morc fonnally wc gcf, ~l;)(~~) -{:r,; E[~, l) ~~i ff.x; G}t; Or ~~ fl(I -x;) C
p;} and 11~1~c(~s) - {x, E~~, ~) ~~t f t(2 - r;) C jr; or ~z f l(~: - 1) G P;}
for i E { I,'l}. - -
'l'he uotion of po6ential rnarkcL arcas is usccJ lo d(scribc tllc al.rueLur(e of
compctition atnong thc two firrns.
Definition 2.2 ~l yivcu 1171fC3 lhrtc is slrnnq compclilion if lhc polcnlial
markcf. arcas of lhc lwo finrts al Lhcsc prir.cs lertnc a noit('.TRI)l1~ inlcrscclion
for bollt lypcs of aycnls, lhctr, is tacak cotnpr.lilion if lhc polcrelial mnrkr.l
amas of lhc firrres at lltr.sc prias Itavc u uortcntpl~ islct'srclian for nuc nf lhc
lwo lypr.s of aycnLs and Jor lhe alhcr t~r. lhc. iulcrscclion i.c l:4lhCT' (t poinl
or emply, unrl lher~c is no r,ompelilion al lhcsc priccs if lhr. polenlial tnarkcl
am.as of lhc finrts al lhcsr. pricr.s havc an intcnsr,ction ,ahich is cilhcr a poinl
or e.rrepl~ for óolla l~pr.s of aycnls.
"l'hc yir.(, of Lhc poLcnLial markcl arca of firm j, j E {I,'l}, of agcnl.h of typc
i, i E{1,`l}, aL price ~~ is Lhe toLal length of Lhe intcrval oI agenl,s of Lypc
i for whir.h Lhc tiurn of 1,h(~ rclaóional cosf, Lo (irm j and Lhc pri(~.c of firrn j,
~~, doc~ uol, cxca~cl Lllc rc:~crvaLion pricc p;. 'I'lIC tillrllnlllTn of t.llc ,izcs of
Lhe potcnlial markcl arcas of firm j of agcnLti of Lypc I and Lypc Z iti callcd
I,hc market sizc of (irrn j. We dcnoLc thc rnarkct tiizc of firtn j, j E { I, `l}, at,
priccs ~1 ancl ~z by M~(~), ~t}. 'hhc prolits of firm 7, 7 E { I, `L}, al. priccs rfir
and ~1 arc (~yual Lo (~~ ~~~)Mi(~),~2) ancl ar(~ denotccl by Ili(r[i),~z)-
II, i5 e.esy Lo verify i.ha~. ell(, poLential market. ar(~as of tllc Lwo (innti fur apcnts
of typ(~ i., i E{ 1,2}, havc a uonemply intcrtiCCIJUn Irl Ci13C ~ -1~ -~ ,c -~ C p; and
have au inl,crscction which is cither a point or crnpl,y in cxsc `~~i f,r-~ ? P;.
'fhis rneans lhaL Lhere are four di(fereut regíom under couc(~rn.6
For m~-~ f 4 1 p~ and ~~i2f 4 ~ pz we have the situation of no competition.
The market size of firm j, j E {1,2}, is given then by
Mi(~i,~x) - min ~2a(Pi - ~~), 2~(Ps - ~~)1
For m~z4~ f~ G p~ and m-i~~~ 1 p2 we have Lhe situation of weak
competition, where the firms compete for the sellers. The market size of firm
j, j E {1,2}, ia given then by
Mi(~t,~2) - min ( ~ (~k - ~~ t 2), 2~(Ps - ~~)1
with k ~ j E {1,2}.
~ ~ ~ ~
For ~1 f ~ ~ pl and ~im~ -F ~ C pz we have the situation of weak
competition, where tfie firms compete for the buyers. The market size of
firm j, j E{1,2}, is givcn then by
1Lfi(m~,~z) - min ~2a(Pi - ~~), ~(~k - ~~ f 2)1
with k ~ j E {1,2}.
Finally, for m~z 1 f~ G p~ and ~~~~ -h ~ G pz we have the situation of strong
competition. The market size of firm j, j E { 1, 2}, is given then by
Mi(~i, ~s) - min ( ~(~k - ~~ f 2), ~(~k - ~~ f 2)1
with k~ j E {1,2}. l7
3 Equilibria
I',ach finn j, j E{ I,`L}, chuuzc~ facw ~~, i E{ 1,2}, a.ti Lo maxirnizc~ il.ti profits.
Wc dcdinc, lirm j'h ~Lratc~y ~~ E~-~O,Pt~ x~~,Ps~ ~c thc tuplc uf priccs
charRed by linn j. 'I'hc pro(ita of firnr 7, J E { I,'l}, arc clcnotcxl by Ili(r~r, ~z)-
'l'hc garnc in wóich firrns simull,ancxiutily choosc pricc~c, ix rafcrrcd to as C.
I~or cyuilibriurn analysis wc usc thc Nash cyuilibriurn concept.
DeRnition 3.1 A purr; Na.tih cquiliLriunt for f.hc ~antc C i.h ct ixtir nf ..Iralr;-
~ic.ti (r~i,~it) E~ x~ such lltnt Ili(~i,~z) ? Ili(~i,~s) V rlii E~~nd
Ilz(~i,~i) ~ llz(~i,~z) d ~z E ~.
lic;c:autic finnti arc located tiymrnctrically it tnakcs scnsc to look for an cxtui-
librirnn in which both (irtrrti clioosc Lhc tiarrm priceti. MonYwcr for bot.h firmti
dcrnand ancl supply nwst bc c;qual in cvtnilibrium. 'I'hia ir tiLatcYl iu Lhc
followin~ Icmtna.
Lemma 1 Al any Nash aluiliGriurrt (~i,~i) oj lhr gamc C, rlcraanrl and
xuppl~ rtrr: r.qual for bolh fir~rns.
Proof Suppotic; (irst that clc;mancl iw grcatcr I,lian tiupply. 'I'hc~n incxc~.winl; I,hc~
(cx; for tlin buycra incrcaxc~ pro(il.~ bc;CAU5C tiU~)f)Iy will nuL c'hanl;c. Suppotic'
fICXL Llldt (ICrnand is srnallcr Lhan supply. 'I'hcn iuc:rea.ving Lhc: pricc for Lhc
wcllerti incrcascs profits. So dcmand must c;yual supply in cyuilibrium.
I~or tóc situation cr C(i cquilibrium outcxirnca arc qivcn in I'ropotiiticrn I and
Proposition 'l. ln Sect,ion 4 we givc an interprctatiun of óhetic rctiulLa.zi
Proposition 1 Le! tY C(j be given and !et pl C o4pR t for pz - 4Á. Then
there ezists a unique Nash equtlíbrium (mi, ~2) E ~ x~ for the game G given
by
2o}!i Y -P- (v}4R)Pz-aP, ~
~ z(n}P ~ z(a}P)
C O,Pz - p Pi ~
~p~-en~,o~
CPi-4,Pz-~p~
G 0, Pz - ;p 1
C z~ t - Pz,Pz -~p` ~
Proof See Appendix.
tI Pt f Pz C atR
e
2p ~
z}Á Pz ~ Pi C otzA Pz
PtCztOPz, PiCá
Pz C a}zp Pi, Pz ~ 4p ) ~ , ot
Pi - a, Pz - ap~




zR - Pi Pz - aA
za}3(I t
if Pi f Pz ? aR ,
at ~ ~ a}Q t
4P - Pz - zp
íl Pz? ~Q~, Pt?4.
Propoaition 2 Let a c Q be given and let p'~ ~ a4pR ` and p~ - 4p. Then
there ezists a continuum of Nash equilibria (~~, ~2) E~ x ~ for the game G
characterized by ~~ -~~ -G cp,0 1 vrith cp E[ a;~R `,p~ - 4].
Proof See Appendix.
To be complete and to provide a benchmark we also give the Nash equilibria
in case the agents' densities are the same, i.e., tr -(3. This requirement
complicates the proofs, because now the situation of strong competition can
occur in equilibriunt, which gives rise to a lot of indeterminacies. Conse-
quently there are several ranges of reservation prices for which there exist
continua of equilibria. Section 4 again provides an interpretation of these
results.g
Proposition 3 Lcl rr - ~i Gc gincn and lcl p~ } pj G ;i in caYC ji~ ~,`-~ and
p'.r ~ Á. !f furf.hcrtnorr p,~ G ';~r for Ir~ -,~-~, J~ k E { I,'l}, lltcu lhcrr rzisls
~ urriyur. Na.yh r:yuiliGrium (~i,Qit) E rh x 4 for lhc grnnr C; ginrn Gil







:Í Pi } V: G l, ~ C pi G:tpl rf IrIG1 I,IGÁ- -
if ~,, ~ s1,.1, i'~ ~ ;
ij l G p~ -F pl G`1 , p~ ~ ~, jr.l 1 1.
Proof Scc Appcndix.
Proposition 4 l.cl a -~i Gr~ givcn and lr~l j,, f pZ ~`1 . hiu-lhrrmorr.
!cl pi ~,~-~ anrl jrl 1,~ -~. 7'hcn ller:rc r.xists a cortlinuum nj Nash cquiliGria
(~i , ~l) E ~ x ~ jnr lhc gamc (i CharYl(tl('.T7ZCII Gf ~1 - (t11 -G ~, l - yo ) urilh
~P E[0, Pi - á~ n[~r - 1rt, l].
Proof ticc Appendix.
Proposition 5 l.cl cr -~i Gc ginen. hirrthcrynorc lcl pi ~ ';~r nnd p1 ~,r-r.
'I'hen lhr:re czisls a cnnlinuum oJ Nash r.quiliGrin (rfii,Qi1) E ~ x ~ jor thr.
gamr. G charnctr.rizcd bg ~i -~2 -G ~p,0 ~ wilh y~ E(l,p~ -,`-~]. ,Sirnilnrdg,
lcl pz 7 ;~r artd p~ ~ ~. 7'lar:n lhr,rc ezisls a coulinnum oJ Nash cquiliGrin
(~i,~1) E ep x~ Jor lhc game C cltaracterizcrl GJ ~i -~~ -C (l,ip 1 ruilh
r
~P E [l,Pz - ~~~
Proof Src Appcndix.
In thc appcudix it is shown that. the seL o( cquilihria characteriiA~d in I'ropo-
Sitions :l, 4 and Fi is cxhautiLivc in casc n- ~i.lo
4 Characterization of equilibria
In order to discuss the different types of equilibria we label the different
regions of reservation prices in Propositions 1 and 2 as in Figure 4.1 and
summarize the results of the previous section. For the case a G(i we refer
to Table 4.1.
Area Fees Profits
I G ~xotP)Ái-lfys (otsP)yz-ay~ ~ aR x
} ) ~ 2(otR) ' 2(atli) P~ Pz z(atp)t
II" G 0, Ps - p Pi ~ 2 i Pi ~Pz - p P~ )
II6 G p~ - e pz,0 , 2A Pz~Pi - ó Pz)
III G Pr -~~Pz -~~ 2~Pi t Pz - 4p `~
IV" G zp `- Pz~Pz -~p ~ Q es~pxp ~
IV6 G O,Pz - ;p ~ z ~Pz - ;PI
Tablc 4.1: The different regions in case cr G~i.
We car~ distinguish between three areas of no competition and three areas of
weak competition. IL is checked easily that the corresponding fees and profits
change continuously in and between the areas, except between the areas II6
and IV' where pz - 4á and p~ ~ Q~Á t.
Areas I, lla,IIb: No competition.
In thc arca.4 I, II" aud I16, the reservation price oí at lcast one of the types
of agents is so low, Lhat both firms establish 'local monopolies'. In area I,
the differences between the reservation prices of the sellers and buyers are
suf6cienLly low to obtain an equilibrium with both fecs positive. 'fhe fees are
such that agents with a higher ru~ervation price also pay a higher fee. This
property also holds for the areas Ila and llb, in which cases the differences
between reservation prices are relatively high. ]n these areas, the firms even
actually desire to subsidize the agents with the lowest reservation price.{t
Sina~ wc~ r1.til.ric'I, uuraclvc,n Lu nun nr};~il.ivc fcv~s, Lhia incans 1.11at. Llic,tic, .G};cuLti
are sc~rvc,d for fnK~. 'I'h1~ willin~;nc:tis Lu subtii11iz1~ Lhc a~;c~nl.ti wil.h t.lic luwcal.
rexcrval.iun tiricc cotncs frunl Lhc markcl. cxt.crnalil.y assuciaócYl wit.h 1nal.ch
ing. In unlcr Lo lnakc a profiL, bol.h sc~llc~rs anc{ {n~ycrs arc nccdcd. I~ur ~uf(i-
cic~nl.ly diffcrcnl. nscrvaLion pricc~, Lhc dcmxncl clGxa. uf al.l.rac6in~ agcnt.s is
ti6rougcr Lhan t,hc uc~;aLivc pricc clfccl, on proliLti. Only I,lic agcnl.ti wil.h Lhc














I~ifiurc ~.I: 'I'11c diffcrenL rc~gions in catic cr G~i.12
Areas III, IV', IV6: Weak competition.
In azeas III,IV' and IV6, the reservation prices are sufficiently high to
create a aituation of weak competition. In area III, the situations oí weak
and no competition coincide.
In area III, the reservation prices are still sufl~ iciently low and close to each
other to have both typc of agents to be treated 'symmetrically'. The sellers
located at a distancc~ ~ from the firms have a zero surplus. A fraction ,0 - c~
of the buyers is not served. Firms do not try to ca.pture these buyers, since
demand and supply must be equal in equilibrium.
In areas IV" and IVb, 'symmetry' between buyers and sellers disappears.
Now, the reservation prices are so high, that the sellers located at a distance
4 from both firms claitn a positive surplus. The sellers can take advantage of
their position in the rnarket, because they form the short side of the market.
The negative price effect on profits is more than compensated by the positive
effecL on the mazket size by attracting the sellers.
The advantageous market position of a seller in case of high reservation prices
is exercised maximally in area IV6. Similar to the area 116, the firms desire
to subsidize the sellers. This implies that the sellers are served for free. The
profits in IV6 are increasing in the reservation price o[ the buyers, with no
upper bound. Since competítion on the long side of the market never occurs
in equilibrium, the buyers can be charged maximally.
For the case ~ - ~3 the equilibria can be distinguished by the azeas I, II'
and 116 as before (with ~-~i aubstituted) and the areas III, IVa, ÏV6, IV`
as in Figurea 4.2a and 4.26, with corresponding fees and profits as in Table
4.2, where ip E[0,pr - 4] fl [4r - p~, t] in azea lVa, ~p E[t, p~ - q`-] in area IV6,
and ~p E [t, pr - 4] in area IV`.I:i
Arca I~cxs I'rolil.ti
I G{s~th)n~-~~, (~~ttlt)áz-~~á~ ~
c 1 r
~.~t ~ ~ a
~l c f 11) r itntl (atl ) ) z(~tl )r
ll" G O,Vz -~i Pr ~ ~`~ Pr~P1 -~ Pr)
llb G pr - ~ pt,0 ~ 'l~ Px~Pr -~ Pz)
, lll G Pr - ~,Pa - ~~ z~Pr f Ps ~ 1)
IV~a Gy~,l-y~~ 1l
IV~ G O,y~ ~ ïy~
IV G cP,O ~ lcv
'I:rblc ~.1: 'I'hc di(Grrenl, rcgions in catic, rr -~i.
'I'hc arc:r.ti l, ll" ancl llb do not, chanfic wiLlr rospect. Lo thc sil.ual.ion rr G
~i, sincc nu conrpct.ition occurti iu equilibricnn. 'I'hc araan a.vncrciaLcxl with
cornpct.it,ion do changc, huwcvcr. Wcak and st.run); curnpctit,ion cuincidc in
arca lll. I~or tlrc arcati IV~~,IVr, IV~ wc havc titron~ conrpcl,il,ion.
Area IÍI.
In arca lll, t,lu, ait,nations of aimpctition and no compctitiou cuinciclc. AI-
though I I I iti nlrapc~cl sirnilarly as arca lll in I~igurc ~.I , it iti largcr, howevcr.
In ordcr Lo gct ccimpct.itiun, Lhc rescrvation pricc, havc to bc larficr. 'fhc
rcason iti t.haL for Lhc" caac rr G ~i, Lhc nc);al,ivc tiricc e(fect on pro(its by
I,hc lowcr kv~, chargecl unclc,r courpcl.ition is donrinatcd, tiincc unly conrpc-
titiun for zcllcrs can occur in equilibrium. l~irms can 'a(furd' luwc"r focs for
Llu" scllcrti alrcady fur luwcr rescrvat.ion pric:cti, sincc (ur Imycrv fcc, rcmain










Figure 4.2a: Different regions in case o-~i.
Areas ÏV`,ÏV6,ÏV`.
For the case of strong competition, different types of continua of equilibria
coexist. For reservation prices in area IVa, for one continuum of equilibria
the feea are divided in an arbitrary way, provided their sum is t. Exploitation
of one of the market sides does not occur in this equilibrium. Notice that
also a'fair' treatment of agents, that is, cp - ~, is allowed as an equilibrium.I~xploiLaLiun uf onc of 1,6c rnarkcL tiidcw cumcti back in Llic i,wo oLhc~r cunLiuua
~
of cquilibria for Lltc arc~s IV and N~. In Lhctic arcas cxtuilibria cxitit, in
which onc Lypc uf ahcnt.n iti scrval (or fnv~ arid Lhc othcr Lypc iti c~xttluiLecl
contplcLcly. 1?quilibria uf Lypc lVu, whcrc t,ltcrr iti au uppc,r buruid un I,hc
profit,ti, I,hus cocxist. wil.h cquilibria of I,ypc IV~~ or N~, whcrc Lhcrc cxitiL
c~quililtria. fur wl~ic'h I,lic prolil,ti Lcnd Lo infinil,y if Lhc appropriaLc rrtirrval.ion
pricc Lcnclti Lo in(iniLy.
Sl
4
F-.--1 ----1 - ;
:A[
I~igurc 4.2b: I)i(fcrcnL rcgions iu ca,tic rr - ~i.
5 Comparative statics
In unlcr Lu pruvidc somc morc insigh6 in Lhc dilfcr'enaw ancl nirnil.r.ril.icw Irc-
Lwecn I,ha catic cr C(i ancl I,hc casc cr -(~ wc, will cliticuss cquililtriinn trric'ing
ancl cqnilibrinm pro(il,s in morc dcLail in I,his sc~cl.ion. In ordcr I,o utic t,hc
til.anda.nl circ'nlar tnodcl ouLcontc :uti a bcnclinrcrk wc Icl, jti - p1.16
From Section 3 we know that in case tx G Q and pl - pz - p, the equilibrium
fees ( ~i,~~) are given by
C á}P P~ } Á P 1 if p G 4p t
C P- i, P-
at
~ if
a}0 t G C
zo}aA t
4 4(3 4Fi P- 8(3
n}P t- at 2a}3(i t otlf t C zQ p, P- 4R 1 íf sa G p G QZ
G 0,p - 4Á 1 if p 1 Qz~ t.
This result is drawn in Figure 5.1.
~i. ~z.
~ ~




Figure 5.1: Equilibrium fees in case ~ C Q for j E{1,2}.17
I~ur~hcnnurc wc kuow from SrYa.ion 3 Llrat. iu i~~~tir~ rr - ~i and Pr - Pz - P
cqnililrriunr priccs arc ~;ivcn Iry
G 1, 1 7 if p C 1
Gp-q,P-~1 if 1GpG'~`
~r-~a- Gcp,f.-yo~ if p1'~`,V~E[U,P-~]n[~~~-P,r~
G'p,(1~ if p~ A`, 4~E~~,P-~]
~(I,cp~ if p~ ~~`, 4~F[~,1~- i~.
'I'hiti resull. is drawn in I~il;urc ~i.'l.
~i, ~e.
~ ~
l~igurc ~i.2: I:quilibriwn fccs in c~.tic rr - ~i for j E{ 1,2}.18
The complication here is that there is a continuum of equilibria for p~ 4`
and that there are even three types of continua for p 1 4`, which gives
rise to a coordination problem. Although our purpose is not to solve this
coordination problem, we will take the 'fair' solution ~i -~2 -G Z, 2~ for
p~ 4t as a benchmark for the comparison between the case o G Q and the
case a-~. To our opinion there are several reasons that are in favour of the
fair solution. Firstly, the solution for p C 4` is also fair. Secondly, the fair
solution provides a lower bound on the firms' proóts which seems suitable
from a social point of view. Thirdly, the fair solution is equal to the solution
for the standard circular model (see Webers (1995)).
R.ecall that the fair solution can be obtained through maximizing profits,
which is price times market size. This essentiafly means that, in case a- A,
there is no matching problem for the social planner. In case a G Q, this
is not true if reservation prices are high enough, because the social planner
then also is concerned about the agents that are not served.
Firms' profits are drawn in Figure 5.3.
If the reservation price is relatively low, i.e., p G "epp `, we are in regions
I,III,IV" in case a G~3, and in regions 1 and III in case ~- Q. For
p C ~8p `, profits are higher for the situat,ion a G Q t.han for the situation
~-~.
If the reservation price is relatively high, i.e., p~ a4Áa `, we are in region IVb
in case a G Q, and in regions IVa,IVb, IV~ in case cY -,(3. For p? a4p `
profits are higher for the situation a G,0 than for the situation ~- p.
Competition for the sellers becomes more severe in the latter case, which
lowers profits.
If the reservation priccs are intermediate, i.e., `~g~Q ` G p C o4pp `, profits
are higher for the situation ~-(i than for the situation a G Q.II,,II1
,~}!i t i n}a!i e:~~ ~,}!i ~.





I~igurc fi.3: Gyuilibrium prcrfiLn.zo
6 Effects of subsidies
In order to discuss what happens if prices may become negative, we need to
restate the propositions from Section 3. The proofs are similar to those from
Section 3 and are omitted. Allowing for subsidies mcans that the tuple of
prices charged by any firm belongs to ~~ -[-c,pt] x[-c,p2] fur some c 1 0.
For the situation tx G~ cquilibrium outcomes are given in Yroposition G and
Yroposition 7. Then~ is a shift in the different regions, but the structure of
the equilibrium outcomes remains unchanged.
Proposition 6 Let rY G Q and let pt G Q4pA t ~- c Jor pz - 4Q - c. Then
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (~i, ~z) E~~ x~~ Jor the game G
given by
(Za}A)P~-Aps (a}zA)Y~-aD~
G z(a}A) ' z(Q}A) ~
G -c,Ps - pp~ - Fc 1
Gp,-epZ-ac,-c~
GPi-4,Pz-;p1
G a}p t - at ~
sA ps,Pz - iA







Pi f Ps C iP t,
~ ~ z a}A ~
P~ - zo}A Pz - ze}A '
~ a}4 2 a}A c
Pi - o Ps f
Pi C 4 - c,
G ~ 2 a}A c
pl - YatA pZ - Ya}A
a 2 a}(f c
p2 G a}zA pl - a}ZA '
C at - C Ps - aA
Pi ? 4- c, Ps ? áp - c'
Q2p t C Pi f Pz C zo~p t




P2 ~ ozQ t f c, Pi ~ 4- c
Proposition 7 Let rr G(j and let pt 1 a4p t ~- c Jorpz - 4p - c. Then
there ezists a continuum of Nash equilibria (~„~z) E~~ x ~~ Jor the game
G characterized by ~~ -~z -G tp,0 ~ with y~ E [ tr4ÁA t .} c,pl - 4].
Compared to the situation of no subsidies (c - 0, as in the previous sections)
we see that the size o( regions 1, Ill, and IV' increases with c, whereas thezl
tiizo uf rrgiuns 1!" :rnrl llr' rlr~r rta.vrh wil.h r'. I~irr n~l;iun I Vr' I,his is anrlril;uuux.
'1'hc tilrorl, sidc uf I,hc rnarkcL iti tir~rvr~rl al {rrirr, -r in Lhc n~l;ium ll", !Ir',
an(1 IV~ whir'.h w.LV zcru bcforc. I~url.hcrnwm wc tirY, Lhal. Lhcrc is a dr~rnand
effcct in Lhc (loc'.al rnonopuly) rofiions ll" and llb wlrich cxutirw Lhr- luwr,r
pria~ for Lhc long sidc of thc nrarkeL conipared Lo I,Irc tiil.ual.ion r' - 11.
I~inally wc look at lhc siLuaLion whcrc rr -~i. 'fhc cquilibrium uuLronrcti arc
given Lhcn in Lhc following Lhnr propositions.
Proposition 8 Lcl (r - ~i Lr gincn aiul lr'l pr }- p1 G`~ in rasc pr ~ Á- r
utarl pt ~ ,`-r - r. If fitrlhcrynnir jrr, G ';r` f r Jni' jr~ - ~- r'~ J~ l.' E { 1,2},
lhcn lhcrr cxisls rt itniqttc Nrtslt rquiliGriinrt (rlii,Qr:z) E ~,. x~, fnr lldc qamr
C yinen Gy
:ry,-i~, rn,-i,r G I ~-~' G r G ai. ~r' G,r , A 1 iJ VrfPz- .r s 1i- 1zf
G-r,ps - pr - c~ if pr G 1i - i, Pr G ~- r'
~i -~a - G i t. r, -c ~ 2I Yi ~:3p1 f 4c, Px C ~- r' )r-)z- -
G Pr - ~, P2 - ~~ if l G pr ~ p.z G ~, pr ~ ~- r, Ír~ ? ~-
Proposition 9 l,cl (Y -~j GC rliY7L'il niarl lcl pr -t- p.z 1`1r. I'7t7'Lldl'2'11t(liY' lCl.
pr 1 Á- c rutd pt ~ Á- r'. "I'hr.it lhcrr r.xisGti u rnltlinunm of Nn.tih rriuiliGria
(rh„(hl) E fi,. x ra,- for lltc qninc C('h(LIYdr'l!'i'2~ClI G1I (~ii - c~il -G yo,l - y.~ ~
vnilla 4~ E [-r',Vi - n] n[~nr - Vs, l f c].
Proposition 10 l.r.l rr - ~i bc givr:n. !'7q'Lldr'i'Ir1r17Y lf.l 11r ~'~` } r' ardd
p1 1 Á-r:. 'ITtlJt lILlJY: I:22.4G5 rL r'071142tidtttra Oj Nn.tilt c(irtililrria ( c~ii, r~i.i) E~,. xrh,-
Jor' lhc yrtntc C ('lLdl1Y1CL(li'2ZC(l L9 -G -r' 1'tllillt E L~ r', r r ~~~-~i- ~a, w Í ir-A].
.Sirnilrtrhl, Irl pl ~ `;rr f(' rtn.rl pi 1,r-r - r'. "I'hrn. lhr.2Y rrisls a rnlaliiduum.
oJ Nn.,la f,rl1L111.L2'2!L (tpi, cbz) E 4r,. x rD, fur llar grunc (~ ('llrtTYt!'lfi'tZr'!1 LII ~i -
-G -c, ~ mitla E f f r, r t ~z - 4~ rP [' 1 z- n]'
As is r~r4~ily ,r~cu Llrcm al;ain iti a shifl, in Lhc diffr-n~nl. rcl;ionti, buL Llre sl.ructurc
of 1.hc cqnilibriurn out.c,orncs remains unc'han{;cd unr o nrorc.22
Appendix
ln order to prove the propositions we first specify the four relevant maximiza-
tion problems. In the region of prices where there is no competition firms
choose prices ~~ and ~~ that maximize
(~~ f ~~) min ! 2ct
(Pr - ~~ ), 2~(Pz - ~~) ?
subject to the price constraints l
111
G m' -ii i i
Pi zz z f~, OC~~ CP~
Pz C m~~ -} ~, 0 G~~ C Pz.
lu tlic rcgion of priccs whcrc thcrc is wcak conipctitiou and Lhc firrns compctc
for sellers firms choose prices ~~ and ~~ that rnaximize
(m~ f ~~) min ( q(~~ - ~j f- 2), 2~(Pz - ~~) ) (6.2)




In the region of prices where there is weak competition and the firms compete
for buyers firms choose prices ~~ and ~~ that maximize
2a t l
(~~ f ~~) min É(Pr - m~), ~(~k - ~~ f 2)1 (6.3)




In L6c rchiuua of V,riccs whcrc t.hc~rc is aLron~ ruinpcLit.iou firtnti cliuusc trrices
~~ and c~~ LhxL rnaxitnir.c~
l~i t ~i) IRtri ( fl (~k - ~j } ?)i fi(V'k - ~J } L)~
((1.~3)
tiubjr~rl. Lu Lhc pric~c~ c-unvLrainl.y
p~ ~~ ''imjf~, OG4'j~l'r
d'1t~ e t
pz) 1 ~,~, OG~,CPx-
Proof of Proposition 1
I~irst considcr (.hc tiiLua(.ion of no compct.il,ion. Hcc:aunc dctnand ancl supply
havc to bc cqual in equilibrium, wc can aubsLil.uLcr ~i~ -)r.l -~f p~ f~{ c~~ inLo
maximizat.ion problcrn (fi.l ) for j E{ I,`L}. NoLc t.hal. onc~ of Lhc cunsLrainl.a
hccornc~. redundanl.. If wa dcnotc Lhc vc,ctor uf Laf;r:ui};c~ niull,iplic,rti by ~, E
li.'~, Lhc~ corrctipondirifi La);ran~ian for (irm j, ) E{ I,'L}, rcaclti C~(c~~, ~i) -
("~~t c~~j f-Pz - jf Pi~ (L(Pi-~~))-~ii(Lpi-fii-c~'i-1)-1~.e(~f pi~ jf.~-~~ rli~-
~k - 1) - a~a(-~~) -~~~(~~ - Pi) -~i~~(Pi - ~ pz -~~) wil.li d: iE J E{ I,'L}.
r
I~irrn ~, J E {I,'l}, I,huti wants I,o maximizc G~(rl,~, 1i) wil,h restrf~c'I. Lu c~ii
and a~ E Itt. 'I'Irc (irst, ordcr conclitions for profi(, maximization for lirur 7,





1,a(~; - pr ) - 0
~~`~(Pi - ~ P1 - ~i) - 0
('Lj,i-~i-~~-i)CO
~-,I1-!)GO
( ~{ )'1 } )'1 - (f ~i `f~k 2
(-c~;) C (l
(~~ - pi ) C 0
~f - -~~)C(1 (Pr - . )'1 ~
air 10,1 E {I,l,:i,~,~i}.24
Due to symmetry the first order conditions are solved by ~~ -G ~'', ~z' ~
for j E{1,2}. Solving these equations we get
G(xoz
Q)tp)~~' (a}zat0)aá. ~ if Pr f Pz C ap ~,
~Ps~Pi c aóx P2
C O,Pz - jr Pi 1 if p~ C s~,tli Px, Pi C á i
C Pr - ~ Ps,O ~ if p2 G QtsP P~, Pz ~ áP
G Pr - 4,Ps - 4p ~ if Pr t Pz ~ z0 ~, Pr ? 4,
oc
Pz ~ au~
The last thing we have to do is to check whether or not (any of) these so-
lutions can be improved upon. For all the solutions it holds that deviating
by setting a higher price for the sellers (and consequently also for the buy-
ers) decreases profits. The more interesting situation is deviating by setting a
lower price for the sellers, which of course cannot occur in case the other firm
charges prices G 0, px-p pr 1. If the other firrn chazges G p'r-e pZ, 0 1, devi-
ating by setting a lower price for the sellers decreases profits, because demand
cannot increase. If the othcr firm charges G p~ -,-'~, px-,~~ 1, deviating by set-
tin a lower rice for the sellers decreases rofits as lort as - f- G z~}3a `
g P P g' Pr Ps - 4P
Finally, if the other firm charges G(xa}p)p~-~~~(o}s!r)p,-ap, ) deviating z(o~P) aSat0)
by setting a lower price for the sellers decreases profits. For the solution
~~ -~z -G p~ -~, pz -;p ~ we thus have to impose the additional require-
ment that pr f px G zaQp `.
Next, consider the situation of weak competition. Because demand and sup-
ply have to be equal in equilibrium, we can substitute p2 - zp ~~{ -~~ -{- z)
for ~~ into maximization problem (6.2) for j~ k E { 1, 2}. We need not
consider maximization problem (6.3) because a G,0. If we denote the vector
of Lagrange multipliers by a~ E R}, the corresponding Lagrangian for firm
7, l E {1,2}, reads ,C~(~~, ~i) - ~a~~~ - zp~k } P2 - éP~ (mk - ~i f s) -
~~r(~i f ~s f s - 2Pr) - ~is(2Ps - t ~- zÁ - 2~k } p(~~ - ~~)) - ~is(-~~) -
~~4(~~ - Pr) - ais(~k f z- á P2 -~~) -~ic(~~ -~k - z). Firm j. 7 E {1,2}
thus wants to maxirnize G~(~~, a~) with respect to ~~ and a~ E I2t. The first
order conditions for profit maximization for firm j, j E {1,2}, can be written
then asLrr
-,r1 - ~, ~itli~i } ~~~lr~k ~ ~,t,ii r
- a~i ~ ~fa~z f 1~:i - a~~ f 1jr, - ~jr, - ~
~ji(~if~zfi-'LPr)-0
~ix(~Pt - ~ f sli - `l~k ~ ~~(~k - ~~)) - 0
aja(-~;) - 0
~jn( (~~ - pi) - 0
~j5l~l'k~ 2 - 1Í1'3-~~) -f)
~jfi(~j - ~k -nl) - 0
(~1 ~ ~2 t 2 -
l]lr ) ~ ()
(~Jl.j - ] ~ 1~f - l~k ~ (f(~k - ~j)) ~ ~
(-c~,~) G 0
(~~-Pi)CO
~ `--~ ~')CO (~k f .1 , jr.t - ~
(~j - ~iÁ - 1) G O
~jc 1 O, l E{ I,'L, :i, 4, ~i, (i }.
Uuc 1.o symnicl.ry I,hc firsL ordcr c'ondiliouti are solvccl Iry ~i~ -G rli~', ~li~' ~
for j E{ l,`L}. Solvin~ (Irayce cyuaLions wc gcl,
C 0 pl -;~~c 1 if jr1 ~~"~~r c lri ~ ~
~.tlf c ~.c t~~t:rlf c ,.r ~,tli e
~i - ~'z - ~ t!~ - ]r1']~~ - ny ~ if ji~ -f pe ~ ~!f ' n!i ~ ]'t ~ z!r
C Íri - 4, P.1 -;~~i ~ i( pi f p2 C z~.teili c~ 1ri ~ ~~ 1r2 ~ áli.
I''in:rlly wc havc Lo chcck whcLhcr or nuL (any crf) I,huac solul,ions c'an bc
imt~ruvcd upun. As we havc sccu bcfurc wc liavc Lo inrpo5c Lha acldiLional
rcyuircmenL Llcat, pr -F pz ~ `~iJir r for Lhc aolul,iun G pr -,`-r, P~ - ~!i ~.
13ec.autic rr C ~i, Lhc siLurrLiou of til,rong c~.onip~~LiLiun cannol, or c in. Cunilrinin~
t,hctic rctiirltti yicdd:; I'ropoail,ion I.
(Z.I;.U.26
Proof of Proposition 2
For pZ - 4p and pr ~ 04~ r let the other firm's stratcgy be given by G y~, 0~
with ~p E ["4Áp ~, p~ -,`-r~. Deviating by sett,ing a lower price for the sellers
canuot incrcasc profit.s, bccausc thc pricc fur thc bny~,rs is zcro. I)cviatiug
by setting a(little) higher price for the sellers, say y~ -~ 0 with ~ 1 0, and
consequently setting Lhe highest possible price for the buyers, i.e., ~~ such
that ~~ -F Q(4 - zt )- pz, results in profits equal to (y~ ~ pZ f ozpQ ~~ -
~p)( 2- o) which are maxímal for 0- 0 because yo 1 o4p r. Deviating by
setting a much higher price, i.e., y~ f ~ and pz ~ á(~ f 0- p1) where ~~
0' - 2p~ - 2- 2cp results in profits ~~ (cp } 0-~Ps t p('P f~- Pi))(Pi - 4~ - ~)~
which is never optimal. The reason is that the derivative of these profits with
respect to 0 is equal to pr - pz - 2ep - 2~ f Q(pr - c,~ - 0) which is negative
at ~'.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
For o- A the solution to the situation oí no competition is the same as for
a C~i. 'The only di(Ference with the first parL of the proof of Proposition 1 is
that the solution ~~ -~1 - c pr - 4, p2 - 4p ~- G pr - 4, p~ - 4 1 cannot be
improved upon for a largcr range of reservation prices, i.e., for all reservation
prices satisfying p~ tpz C zr . If the other firm charges prices G p~ -- q` ,pz - 4 1,
deviating by setting lower prices, say G p~ - 4-~, p2 - 4- ~~, yields profits
(pl f p~ - z- 20)( ~-}. ~). The derivative of these profits with respect to 0 is
equal to pl f pz - 2~ - 3~. So deviating is not optima! as long as pl -}. pz G 2r.
If the other firm charges prices G pr -,r `-, pz - 4~, deviating by setting higher
prices, saY G Pi - 4 f0, Px - 4f0~, yields profits (Pr f Px - s}20)(2-20).
The derivative of these profits w.r.t. 0 is equal to 2t - 2p1 - 2pz - 4~.
This means that deviating by setting higher prices is not optimal as long as
Pi t P2 ? t-
Q.E.D.'lï
ProoC of Proposition 9 a~id Proposition 5
(;onsiAcr Lhc~ tiil.ual.ion uf sl.ron~ rucnpc~l.il.iun. liccautic, clcinand and supply
haw~ Lu Lc r,rtual in c~quilil,riunc, wc~ c'.an .ul„f.it.n(c rh~ - rI~Á f rlij - rbÁ inLu
maximiza6ion problan ((i.4) fur j~ k E { I,'L}. If wc dcnoLc~ Lhc vcc'Lur uf
Lxgran~;c nmll.iplicrs by aJ E I~t, Lhc currespundinfi La~;ran~ian fur lirm J,
j E {1,1}, rc~adti ~Cj(~~,~ Ai) -,I,(lrÁ~ ~- mkA - ~i)(~,~i - ~~ ~- 1) - ~ji(-~~~) -
~i'2(~J - jJl ) - ~i:ilwk - Wk - Wj) - ~l~(Y~J f ~k - ~k - Yt) - ~J'~(~I i- ~~ -~
r-'lpi) - a~r(l~Á f~~ -~i; f z -'lpt). "I'lu~ (ir~l. ordcr couclilionti for prolit.
maximizat,ion for (inn j, 7 E { I,'l}, can br. wril.tcn Lhcn a.v
:{rbk-~k-~r~~i~lf~Ji -ajzfaJ:c-aJ~-aJ~,-ap;-0
aji(-~~) - 0
~jx(~~~ - Pi) - 0 J
~ja(~ A,k - ~ ,kk - ~j) - O
~J~(Y'j ~ Y'k - ~k - ÍJ2) - ()
~j~~(r~l ~ ~2 ,k t L - ~~JI ) - (~
~j1~(l~k ~ Wj - ~k } 1 -- l~J'1) - ()
(-~;) c 0
(~ ,(,;-p ,I,i)G,O
(Y'k - Y'k - Y'j) C O




aj~ ? 0,l E {I,'L,a,4,5,(i}.
I)uc Lo synuncLry tha (irsl ordcr condi(ions are solvcd by ~~ -G rli~`,~l` ~
for j E{I,l}. Solvinl; 1.lictia equaLions wc ~;c~l.,
Gy~,l-y~~
r,h~ - G (l, y~ 7
- ~1 - G cp, 0 1
~ i
GPc-,c,lJZ-~ 1
if UGcpGpi -,c-c, '-~c-p.t GyoGl.
if lGcpCj~1-,c-c
if l G G i- c 4~-li ~
if pi ~ p.l G i
whrrr T~i ~ ~`c :c,ncl 1i.1 ~ ,'-c.
'I~hc~ Iavl. Lhii~}~ wr li:cvc~ Lu c~u iti Lu c'hc~c~ w~ic~l.~u~r ur nuL (any uf) Lhc~tic~
sulut.iuns cau hc iniprovcd upon.28
Recall that any solution ~~ -~~ -G W,v ~ to (6.4) satisfies 0 G~ C p-r - 4
and 0 G v G p~ - ~. First consider the situatiou wherc O G~ G pr - 4 and
0 G v G pz -;. If a firm deviates by setting slightly lower prices, say ~- 0
and v - 0 for some 0) 0, profits are (~ ~- v- 2~)(z -} ~). The derivative of
these profits with respect to prices is equal to W~ v- ry1 - 40, so deviating
by setting lower prices is not optimal as long as ~{- v G t. Similarly we find
that deviating by setting higher prices is not optimal as long as p~ v~ t.
Combining these results gives that ~ ~ v- t. If prices increase more, the
situation of no competition occurs. This requires that t1 ~ ~' - 2p1- z-2~.
Profits are equal then to 2(2~ f pz - pr - 2~)(pr - te - 0). One can check
that the derivative of these profits is negative at 0', so deviating to the
situation oí no competition cannot be optirnal. Next consider the situation
where one of the two prices is zero. Then we need only consider deviations
by setting higher prices. As shown before this means that ~~- v 1 t. Note
LhaL the situation whcrc both priccs arc zcro cannot occur. Finally cousider
the situation where ~- pl - 4 and (consequently) v- p~ - 4. As shown in
Proposition 3, this can only be Nash as long as t G p~ t pZ C 2'.
Q.E.D.Rc,fcl'cl)rc~ti
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